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COMMUNITY, WEALTH, AND EQUALITY
Richard A. Posner‡
I. INTRODUCTION
There is increasing but perhaps misplaced concern about the
possible political consequences of the increasing inequality of incomes in the United States and other developed countries. In this
paper I shall use the concept of “political community” to describe the
kind of stable, democratic, and liberal regime that inequality might
be thought to endanger and I shall offer both theoretical reasons
and empirical evidence for the view that it is the level of income,
rather than income equality, that is important to the maintenance
of political community.
By a “community” I mean a group of people whose relations
with one another are essentially cooperative rather than destructively
adversary. They may compete with each other; there is competition
even within many close-knit, affectionate families. But, if so, their
competition will be sufficiently constrained, whether by fellow
feeling, or other forms of altruism, or a sense of duty, or habit, or an
aversion to conflict, to make it a positive-sum game rather than a
zero-sum or negative-sum game—to make it, in other words, the
kind of competition that Adam Smith had in mind when he spoke
of the “invisible hand,” the kind of competition that characterizes,
more or less (I’ll return to the less), the free-market sector of wealthy
nations.
‡ Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit;
Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. This is the revised text of
a paper given on March 27, 1996, at a UNESCO conference in Paris. the title
of the conference was “Qui Sommes-Nous?” (“Who Are We?”). I thank Kevin
Cremin, Anup Malani, and Sorin Feiner for their excellent research
assistance, Richard Rorty for suggesting the topic, and Rorty, Kevin Kordana,
William Landes, Lawrence Lessig, John Lott, Martha Nussbaum, Sam
Peltzman, Eric Posner, Amartya Sen, Alan Schwartz, Carolyn Shapiro, and
Cass Sunstein for their helpful suggestions on a previous draft.
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A nation such as the United States, in which democratic governance and the rule of law are unchallenged save by a relatively
harmless though sometimes violent lunatic fringe, is a (political, not
familial or ethnic) community, because the relations among its people are predominantly cooperative. Western Europe is a nascent
community, perhaps North America as well. But the so-called
“world community” is not an existent community in the sense in
which I am using the word, as opposed to a sense honorific or aspirational; the nations of the world cannot be depended upon to respect the limits of competition that I have just indicated.
Community is a matter of more or less rather than yes or no.
There are nations that are no longer communities, such as Rwanda
and Afghanistan, and nations in which the ties of community are
frayed, such as Russia, or in which they are beginning to fray, as may
be the case in France.
Although I mentioned the family, the sense of community that
is germane to my analysis is a thin one. No emotional bond is presupposed. The disposition to cooperate rather than to fight may be
habitual, ethical, or pragmatic. All that is important is that the
disposition be voluntary, as the term “cooperate” may imply. Coerced
uniformity of behavior would not be community. Hence the idea of
political community is not exhausted by, although it includes, political stability, as measured by absence of civil wars, of coups (successful
or attempted), of frequent constitutional changes (for example, a
change from dictatorship to democracy), and of domestic political
terrorism, corruption, and expropriation.1 Measures of stability must
be supplemented by measures of political liberty (including democratic governance, the rule of law, and personal freedom) in order to
measure political community comprehensively. Under contemporary
1

See John Londregan and Keith Poole, “The Seizure of Executive Power
and Economic Growth: Some Additional Evidence,” in Political Economy,
Growth, and Business Cycles 51 (Alex Cukierman, Zvi Hercowitz, and Leonardo
Leiderman eds. 1992), emphasizing coups and constitutional changes. I put
“rampant” before domestic political terrorism because occasional political
assassinations, and even so dramatic a domestic terrorist episode as the
bombing of the U.S. federal building in Oklahoma City in April of 1995, are
not destabilizing.
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conditions, however, liberty and stability appear to be positively
correlated. Even totalitarian or authoritarian countries that have
looked very strong, very stable, even unshakable, have had in this
century a way of collapsing suddenly. Willing submission to democratic government implies a degree of trust of one’s conationals—this mass of strangers of no particular distinction to whom one
has entrusted one’s fate—that in turn is a plausible precondition of
cooperative relations and hence of political stability. In Part VI we
shall see that, consistent with this suggestion, measures of political
stability tend to be highly positively correlated with measures of
political liberty.
An effort to explain why some nations have stable democratic
institutions and others do not would require consideration of a large
number of factors, including homogeneity (or difference) of language, ethnic origins, and religion; national history; foreign threats;
education; and a variety of economic factors, including the level and
distribution of income. I shall focus on only one factor, income,
without meaning to deny the importance of the others. A further
qualification is necessary: For reasons having mainly to do with the
inadequacy of money as a proxy for well being, the equality or inequality of measured income across households, individuals,
percentiles of the population, social classes, or other standard aggregates used in economic and other social scientific research is a crude
measure of real economic inequality.2 It may have to be supplemented by other measures of well-being, such as statistics on health,
political freedom and participation, and education, in order to
convey an accurate picture of economic welfare in a society.3
Attempting to do this in this paper would carry me too far afield,
2 See, for example, Hartmut Kaelbe and Mark Thomas, “Introduction,” i n
Income Distribution in Historical Perspective 1 (Y. S. Brenner, Hartmut Kaelbe,
and Mark Thomas eds. 1991); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
455–458 (4th ed. 1992); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 28–30 (1992).
3 See, for example, The Quality of Life (Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya
Sen eds. 1993); Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human
Capabilities (Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds. 1995), and for a
brief summary Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination
and Public Life 51 (1995).
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however, although in Part VI I do incorporate a measure of gender
equality into my analysis. In any event, so long as one is examining
changes in the degree of equality of income over time, or differences in
the degree of equality across nations, income equality may be a
satisfactory even though not ideal proxy for real economic equality,
enabling us to say, not that the United States for example is a nation
characterized by “too much” inequality of income, but that there is
more economic inequality in the United States today than there was
fifteen years ago or that there is more economic inequality in the
United States than in Japan or Sweden.
Among the wealthy nations of the world, the United States and
Switzerland appear to have the most unequal income distributions,
while Sweden, Norway, and Germany have (among those nations)
the most equal distributions.4 It seems that economic inequality in
the wealthy nations of the world, after declining pretty steadily after
the 1920s and especially after 1945,5 has risen since 1980.6 In the
developing as distinct from the developed world, consistent with a
famous thesis propounded by Simon Kuznets, rising levels of income
are associated with rising inequality of incomes.7 So, in general,
4

John A. Bishop, John P. Formby, and W. James Smith, “International
Comparisons of Income Inequality: Tests for Lorenz Dominance across Nine
Countries,” 58 Economica 461 (1991). The other three countries in the study,
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, were intermediate between the
United States and Switzerland at one end and Sweden, Norway, and Germany
at the other. For more recent data, consistent with those of the study just cited
except that Australia has become more unequal than Switzerland, see “For
Richer, for Poorer,” Economist, Nov. 5, 1994, p. 19. These rankings are
broadly consistent with those that my measure of equality, in Part VI of this
paper, yields. See Table A1 in the Statistical Appendix at the end of the paper.
5 Kaelbe and Thomas, note 2 above, at 55–56.
6 For the United States, see, for example, Frank Levy and Richard J.
Murname, “U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of
Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations,” 30 Journal of Economic Literature
1333, 1371–1372 (1992); Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz, “Rising
Wage Inequality: The United States vs. Other Advanced Countries,” i n
Working under Different Rules 29 (Richard B. Freeman ed. 1994).
7 Kaelbe and Thomas, note 2 above, at 9–10 42–47. Contrary evidence is
presented in Jae Won Lee and Suk Mo Koo, “Trade-Off between Economic
Growth and Economic Equality: A Re-Evaluation,” in The Theory of Income
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economic inequality seems to be rising in all but poor, stagnant
nations.8
I emphasize that my analysis is positive rather than normative. I
do not consider whether economic equality is a good thing in its
own right, but only whether it is an effective instrument for
promoting political community.
II. POLITICAL AND E CONOMIC D ETERMINANTS
OF THE INCOME D ISTRIBUTION
The question of the effect of income and the income distribution on the political system is complicated by the two-way character
of the causal path that connects incomes with politics. If, for example, there is great inequality of income in a democracy, the median
voter will have an increased incentive to support heavily progressive
taxes, since the opportunities for redistribution from the wealthy to
the nonwealthy will be great. The more equal the distribution of
income, the less the median voter will have to gain from such taxes
because the less income the wealthy will have to be taxed away. We
might therefore expect, and there is some evidence, that incomes are
more equal in democratic than in nondemocratic nations (where
“democracy” is defined not just formally, but in terms of actual behavior such as voter turnout9), as a result of the political system.10
and Wealth Distribution 155 (Y. S. Brenner, J. P. G. Reijnders, and A. H. G .
M. Spithoven eds. 1988).
8 An issue that I do not discuss directly, is whether, why, and with what
effects inequality in income is growing between, as distinct from within, nations. See, for example, Steve Dowrick and Duc-Tho Nguyen, “OECD Comparative Economic Growth 1950–85: Catch-Up and Convergence,” 79 American Economic Review 1010 (1989).
9 An ambiguous indicator, however, since repressive governments may
compel citizens to vote—one way. Kenneth A. Bollen, “Political Democracy:
Conceptual and Measurement Traps,” 25 Studies in Comparative International
Development 7, 8 (1990).
10 Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik, “Distribution, Political Conflict,
and Economic Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence,” i n
Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles 23 (Alex Cukierman, Zvi Hercowitz, and Leonardo Leiderman eds. 1992). See also Edward N. Muller,
“Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality,” 53 American
Sociological Review 50, 65 (1988); Gerald W. Scully, Constitutional
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But a median-voter model of democratic politics is a terrible
oversimplification.11 It ignores (1) the role of interest groups in the
political process and (2) important institutional limitations on the
operation of the democratic principle.
(1) As a result of the efforts of interest groups, many public expenditures, for example on elite educational institutions such
as the University of California at Berkeley, benefit high-income persons disproportionately. As a result, although it is
frequently asserted that post-tax incomes are more equally
distributed than pretax incomes,12 the pretax income distribution may be the wrong baseline. Incomes might be more
equally distributed if taxes were lower and government
smaller.
(2) Modern democracies are almost always liberal states, and the
core of liberalism—the liberal principles expounded by John
Stuart Mill—insists on limiting the power of the democratic
majority. There are no purely Millian polities. But even the
modern welfare state typically allows considerable occupational freedom and almost complete personal freedom, as
well as a reasonably broad scope for private enterprise, implying recognition and protection of property rights, though
less than laissez-faire liberals would like. The net effect of
these liberties on the income distribution cannot be predicted. But they certainly complicate democratic efforts to
bring about equality of incomes through taxation and other
coercive measures.
Environments and Economic Growth, ch. 8 (1992); Steven Stack, “The Political
Economy of Income Inequality: A Comparative Analysis,” 13 Canadian
Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 273 (1980). Notice
that redistributive taxation will reduce pretax as well as post-tax income
inequality, as high-income people reallocate their energies and investments to
endeavors that escape tax. For example, tax-free municipal bonds are more
attractive to high-income earners the higher the marginal income tax rate, but
the yield on such bonds is lower than the yield on taxable bonds as a consequence of the demand by investors in high tax brackets for tax-free income.
11 See Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, “Political Democracy
and the Size Distribution of Income,” 50 American Sociological Review 438,
450–452 (1985), for an interesting discussion of the limitations of the model.
12 See, for example, “For Richer, for Poorer,” note 4 above.
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These points help explain how the income distribution within a
liberal democratic regime may, in particular historical circumstances,
such as those of the wealthy democratic countries today, tend
toward inequality. The computer having finally come into its own,
the demand for highly skilled labor to operate computers and related
products of advanced technology has increased. At the same time,
the demand for low-skilled and for unskilled labor, especially in
manufacturing, where computers, robots, and other forms of capital
have proved effective substitutes, has fallen, in part as a result of increasingly intense international competition in manufactured goods.
The resulting shift from manufacturing to services in the developed
countries is a shift to forms of work in which the low-skilled or
unskilled tend to receive low wages and the highly educated often
very high wages. And deregulation in a variety of industries has
placed downward pressure on wages. The combined effect of these
developments has been to exert upward pressure on income at the
upper end of the income distribution and downward pressure
elsewhere.13
Moreover, when mental ability rather than physical strength,
courage, and stamina becomes the decisive element in productivity,
income may tend to become more highly correlated with IQ, and
the distribution of IQs is, of course, highly unequal.14 Any such
13 See, for example, Gordon W. Green, Jr., John Coder, and Paul
Ryscavage, “International Comparisons of Earnings Inequality for Men in the
1980’s,” in Aspects of Distribution of Wealth and Income 57, 71 (Dimitri B. Papadimitriou ed. 1994); Kevin M. Murphy and Finis Welch, “The Structure of
Wages,” 107 Quarterly Journal of Economics 284 (1992); Lawrence F. Katz and
Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963–1987: Supply and
Demand Factors,” in id., pp. 35. 65, 76. The shift from high-paying manufacturing to low-paying service jobs is in part illusory, however. Some of the
high pay in manufacturing was and is merely compensation for the physical
danger and other disamenities of such work, rather than a pure return to
productivity. That was why I said that if a clerk and a coal miner are paid the
same wage, the former is actually receiving a higher income. It is another
example of the pitfalls of using income inequality to measure real economic
inequality.
14 Linda S. Gottfredson, “What Do We Know about Intelligence?”
American Scholar, Winter 1996, p. 15.
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tendency is likely to be enhanced by the breakdown of traditional
caste or caste-like barriers to occupational mobility, barriers that drive
a wedge between intelligence and reward. (Critics of affirmative action describe it as an effort to recreate caste barriers to full
competition in labor markets.) And with the decline of arranged
marriage and of taboos against interracial or interethnic marriage,
prospective marriage partners can be expected to be sorted more perfectly by “real” similarities, including intelligence.15
High IQ is likely to have a bigger effect on an individual’s
productivity than great stamina. The latter just increases the individual’s own productivity, while the former may enable increases in
the productivity of others (for example, the high-IQ-individual’s
employees or clients), for which the high-IQ individual will earn a
large premium.16 Stated differently, the rate of return to intelligence
is probably higher than the rate of return to unusual physical
strength or dexterity.17 These examples, although speculative, show
that it is possible for public or private measures that promote equality
of opportunity actually to reduce equality of results, and specifically
equality of incomes.
In principle, society can intervene to alter the distribution of income by its tax and fiscal policies. But the heavy political as well as
economic costs of these policies are increasingly recognized—the
debate over affirmative action is an illustration—and those who
would be harmed directly by them (the wealthy) are adept at orchestrating an effective political opposition. Mill was probably
15

On the tendency to “assortative” mating, i.e., likes mating with likes,
see, for example, Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family, ch. 4 (enlarged ed.
1991). IQ has a large heritable component, so the implication of more perfect
assortative mating is that the IQ distribution, and possibly therefore incomes
as well, will widen in future generations.
16 I am indebted to William Landes for this point.
17 The high incomes of professional athletes are only an apparent counterexample. These athletes earn large returns because television enables them i n
effect to “resell” their output to millions of customers, achieving a multiplier
effect comparable to that of the high-IQ individual who multiplies his
productivity by leading others. See Sherwin Rosen, “The Economics of
Superstars,” 71 American Economic Review 845 (1981).
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mistaken in claiming that while government could do little to
increase the aggregate wealth of society, it had a free hand in
deciding upon the distribution of that wealth across the
population.18
The process by which income equality may decrease in nonwealthy but developing economies seems to be different from the
process described above by which it may decrease in wealthy democratic countries. According to Kuznets’s thesis, economic
development involves a shift of labor from a traditional agricultural
sector to a modern industrial sector. Productivity is greater in the
modern sector, enabling employers in that sector to attract workers
from the traditional sector by offering higher wages. The result, at
first, is a less equal distribution of income. Eventually, with the
shrinkage of the low-wage traditional sector and the emergence of
democratic institutions, which enable redistribution of income from
rich to poor, inequality declines. In time (maybe a long time, as the
experience of Brazil and India suggests), the developing country becomes a developed country and its future path is as described above.
III. INCOME, INEQUALITY, POVERTY, AND STABILITY
Should we fear that the increasing inequality in incomes will
create a restive, potentially destabilizing underclass, who though
democratically impotent because too alienated to participate in voting and other civic activities are potential recruits for violent protest
movements.19 Riots in slum neighborhoods in U.S. cities and in
French suburbs (black in the United States, North African immigrant in France) confirm the existence among the permanently poor
18

Mill, Principles of Political Economy 200 (W. J. Ashley ed. 1926). In
fairness to Mill, his conception of government was remote from that of latetwentieth-century democratic government.
19 See, for example, Rebecca M. Blank, “Changes in Inequality and
Unemployment over the 1980s,” 8 Journal of Population Economics 1, 14 (1995).
For a helpful sociological analysis of the mainly black U.S. urban underclass,
see Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation
and the Making of the Underclass (1993); William Julius Wilson, The Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (1987).
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or near-poor of smoldering resentments exacerbated by social neglect. But these groups do not threaten political stability seriously. In
countries in which the vast majority of the population is reasonably
well off, and able and willing to finance a formidably large and powerful apparatus for the maintenance of public order, an underclass
has no significant political leverage or opportunities. There is always
the danger that the apparatus will become so powerful as to get out
of hand, oppress law-abiding citizens, by doing so undermine the
regime’s legitimacy, and so eventually destabilize the regime. One
theory of revolutionary action is that such action will provoke the
government into adopting radically unpopular, though effective,
methods of suppression, such as torture and collective punishment.
But wealthy countries can afford costly methods of law enforcement
(thus eschewing, for example, torture and collective punishment,
which are relatively cheap because they economize on the costs of
investigation, and the censorship of dissident views) that preserve
civil liberties.
The ability of a wealthy country to support a repressive apparatus
(a criminal-justice and internal-security system) that is at once
effective and civilized—strong but not provocative—is one reason for
the second half of my thesis: that the income level, a society’s
average or median income, does affect political community, even
though the income distribution may not. Another reason to expect
this is that if the mass of the people is very poor, there will be few
defenders of the existing regime against a Putsch. Being badly off,
the people are likely to feel (though often wrongly) that they have
nothing to lose from a change in the system of government.
Almost any reasonable theory of freedom would predict a
positive correlation between freedom and real income. On
the demand side, freedom must be considered a luxury
good so that the resources devoted to the attainment of individual freedom are likely to be greater when per capita income is high. On the supply side, it is undoubtedly more
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costly to repress a wealthy person than a poor person and
the need to do so is probably less acute.20
The point about “resources devoted to the attainment of individual freedom” parallels my first point, about the resources necessary
for a system of internal controls that does not incite revolutionary
action. The point that the need to repress a wealthy person is less
acute is parallel to my second point, about the greater stake of a welloff person in the preservation of the existing system of government.
The implication of this analysis is that unless the distribution of
income is skewed in a particular way—a tiny upper tail and a huge
lower tail—a high average income, even though it is unequally distributed and there is a sizable permanent underclass, will assure
democratic stability. Put differently, his argument implies that a
high median income is a better predictor of political community
than a high average income.
There is little evidence that the size or emotions of the underclass have much if anything to do with the changes in the
distribution of income that we have seen recently, or are likely to see
in the foreseeable future, in the wealthy countries. If average income
is rising, the incomes of the poor may be rising even if the income
distribution is becoming more unequal. (That is, they will be rising
more slowly than the incomes of the nonpoor.) In that event a poor
person will be better off than he used to be even though the gap between him and the wealthy is widening. If people use as their
benchmark for measuring how they are doing their own experience
rather than that of people who live in circumstances remote from
theirs, the widening of the income distribution is unlikely to exacerbate whatever resentments the people in the lowest decile feel
toward those above them in the income distribution. In an age of
global television, however, people make comparisons between their
20 John F. O. Bilson, “Civil Liberty—An Econometric Investigation,”
35 Kyklos 94, 103 (1982). Bilson finds just such a positive correlation between
income and political freedom. Id. at 107. For additional empirical support see
Part VI and Robert J. Barro, “Determinants of Democracy” (unpublished,
Harvard University Dept. of Economics, Nov. 1995).
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own situation and that of others, even foreigners; this was a factor
in the rapid collapse of the communist states of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Postponing the question of envy, this analysis suggests that the
problem of poverty is distinct from that of the growing inequality of
incomes. And if measures (such as progressive taxation) that reduce
the inequality of income also reduce economic growth—for example
by deflecting socially valuable resources into sterile activities like tax
avoidance, or by discouraging economic risk-taking—and thus slow
down the growth in the average income of the population, poverty
and inequality may actually be negatively correlated. There may be
fewer poor people in a society that does not attempt to make the
distribution of income more equal than in one that does. This possibility is masked by the fact that the United States has at once a very
high mean income, many poor people, and a distribution of income
that is more unequal than that of most other developed nations. Yet
one of the reasons for the unusual inequality of incomes in the
United States—the large number of recent immigrants—may illustrate a negative correlation between poverty and inequality rather
than count as evidence that the correlation is positive. Immigrants
accept temporary poverty in exchange for economic opportunities for
which economic inequality may be a price. If I am correct that a
high average income is more likely in a nation that is tolerant of income inequalities, an immigrant may sense greater economic
opportunity in the United States than in his country of origin even
though the transition to his new life will be a painful one. The
unique attractiveness of the United States to immigrants may thus
be related, paradoxically, to the absence of any guarantees that new
immigrants will be well treated. The more that careers are open to
talents regardless of national origin, the more attractive a nation will
be to immigrants, while that very openness may result in a highly
unequal distribution of income as people are sorted into the different
income classes in accordance with attributes of intelligence and
character that vary widely among persons, and as first-generation
immigrants work for low wages to make up for their lack of the language and other skills that are highly valued in the workplace.
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Moreover, nations strongly committed to equality are bound to limit
immigration lest they be flooded with poor people looking for an
immediate improvement in their economic status.
The other side of this coin is that a polity that in quest of equality depresses average earnings will drive many of its most productive
citizens to emigrate to areas of better economic opportunity. This
apparently has been a consequence of the egalitarian policies of the
widely admired, highly progressive government of the Indian state
of Kerala.21
IV. ARE THE B ONDS OF POLITICAL C OMMUNITY
FRAYING?
Even if the issue of inequality is decoupled from that of
poverty—even if efforts to ameliorate inequality are likely to increase
poverty—it is still possible to be concerned that a gradual drift
toward an ever more unequal distribution of income will fray the
bonds of political community.22 We are to imagine a situation in
which the distance between the lower middle class and the upper
class keeps growing, in which at one end of the income distribution
a relative handful of highly intelligent men and women, made
healthy and beautiful by fitness programs, cosmetic surgery, genetic
engineering, and preventive health care, pull down huge salaries
enabling them to live in luxurious sequestered communities and pass
down their advantages to their descendants by direct bequests, by
genetic bequests through assortative mating, and by gifts of expensive schooling, while just above the poverty line labor millions of
modestly endowed individuals at modest wages in jobs that confer
no prestige or security and yield few intrinsic satisfactions, living restricted and relatively unhealthful lives among their own kind. The
inhabitants of the two classes may become so different in values,
outlook, intelligence, interests, aspirations, education, style of living,
21 See Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India Economic Development and
Social Opportunity 198 (1995).
22 As argued for example in Michael Lind, The Next American Nation: The
New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution (1995).
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and even physical appearance (height, figure, apparent age), and so
segregated except in the most superficial workplace encounters, that
they will not be able to understand or empathize with one another.
We will have become a thoroughly class-based society, like
nineteenth-century England—even if poverty has been conquered.
This sketch is overdrawn even if one ignores intermediate income groups. (Each income group will touch another at either end,
so that even if the highest group has very little in common with the
lowest—which is true today—a line of indirect communication will
be established via the intermediate groups.) For it overlooks the rise
in the average income. Twenty years from now, when the mean income of the American people may well have risen by fifty percent
(in real terms), the people in the bottom decile will be much better
off than they are today. They will be healthier, live longer, travel
more, know more things, have broader horizons. Even if people
who today make $1 million a year will twenty years from now earn
$3 million, they will not be three times as fit, healthy, educated, and
so on as they now are. There is diminishing marginal utility of
money.
Indeed, though these are glorious days for wealthy people, the
gap between the wealthiest people and the people just above the
poverty line is smaller than it was in eighteenth-century England,
when the rich lived in magnificent mansions attended by armies of
servants and the average ordinary man was a farm laborer. The
English example suggests, by the way, that there does not appear to
be a threshold of economic inequality above which a society breaks
apart. I said that some fellow feeling is a precondition of willingness
to accept the outcomes of democratic choice, but it may be so little
as to be unaffected by even huge differences in incomes. New York
City is remarkable among other things for the immense inequality
of incomes of its residents, residents who include at one end some of
the wealthiest people in the world, people who literally are billionaires, and at the other end desperately poor people who beg for a living and sleep on sidewalks, though recently and somewhat mysteriously the number of these people has declined dramatically. The billionaires and the other wealthy people are served by a huge army of
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lower middle class taxi drivers, kitchen employees, servants, clerks,
newsvendors, and policemen, who commute long distances from
the outer boroughs of the city. There is an upper middle class of
lawyers and stockbrokers, a bohemian class, a multitude of immigrants legal and illegal, students, criminals, an underclass, and a vast
mosaic of ethnic and religious groups. Yet with all this incredible
heterogeneity, so effectively parodied by Tom Wolfe in his novel
The Bonfire of the Vanities, New York City is a viable, stable,
democratic community. Of course it is stabilized in part by being included within larger polities, the State of New York and more
important the United States. Yet it illustrates the possibility of cooperative if not quite harmonious and certainly not placid
coexistence among people scattered across an enormous spectrum of
incomes.
Another point—the one that famously attracted the scorn of
Anatole France—is that a democratic society recognizes the political
equality of its citizens by granting them extensive rights: the right to
vote, the right to stand for election, the right to speak freely, to be
free from certain kinds of discrimination, and so on. Even if the
economic value of these rights is proportional to pecuniary income
or wealth, to the extent that they have value even to people of modest incomes they increase the self-respect and self-esteem (the sense
of personal “worth”) of all citizens and so make the absence of income equality less stigmatizing, less degrading. At the same time,
however, an ideology of political equality may promote an “every
man a king” attitude that leads people to question the legitimacy of
differences in income: if I’m as good as the next guy, why does he
have forty times my annual income?
V. ENVY AND EQUITY
I have spoken all this time about economic inequality without
mentioning either envy or equity. The two concepts may not be
quite so different as they seem. Envy is negative altruism:23 if I am
23

At least when “altruism” is defined as an emotion or inclination, rather
than in terms of actions.
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envious of a wealthier person, the implication is that my happiness
would increase if the person lost his wealth, because then my envy, a
source of disutility, would be abated. People who would like to see
greater equality of incomes do not justify their preference in terms of
envy. They say that a more equal distribution of incomes would be
more just. But if there were no envy, and if I am right that efforts to
equalize the distribution of incomes (which should not be confused
with efforts to reduce poverty) would reduce average incomes, then
only the envious would be better off. In any event, the envy factor is
automatically taken into account in a democratic society. It is here
that the tendency to equality in such a society bites. If the distribution of income gets too far out of line with the preferences of a large
bloc of voters, the politicians will respond and laws will be passed
that reduce, or at least mask, the inequality.
I differ from Rawls in not thinking envy entirely a bad thing.24
It is, in a curious way, a form of social cement, enabling us to identify empathetically with others who are unlike us, to feel their
joys—albeit as our pains—and their pains, albeit as our joys. The
opposite of envy is altruism, but the mean between envy and
altruism is indifference to others. In any event, in a society in which
the system of property and contract rights is sufficiently robust to
make it difficult to alleviate one’s envy by making the better off
worse off, envy is a goad to effort and success—effort to rise above
others, but not to push the others down.25
If envy depends on empathy, this implies that it may be more
acute when differences in income are small than when they are
24
25

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 530–541 (1971).
Rawls recognizes the existence of “benign envy,” which he calls
“emulation,” id. at 533, but does not consider the possibility that a society
which protects people against assaultive, defamatory, or otherwise aggressive
acts by the envious will channel bad envy into good. He does not consider this
possibility because envy and emulation are different feelings, rather than the
same feeling differently acted upon. He is right; envy is tinctured with
hostility, and emulation with admiration. But he ignores the possibility that
the envious will be stimulated by their envy to constructive effort, just like the
emulators, if the constructive path is made easier than the destructive by the
political and economic arrangements of the society.
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large, because it is easier to empathize, whether positively or negatively, with people who are like one. Certainly the behavior of
academics suggests that envy is not a function of large differences in
incomes. Tocqueville famously suggested that “greater equality tends
to produce envious comparisons: as they become more equal individuals find their inequality harder and harder to bear.”26 To the
extent that the goad of envy fails to bring about equality, and the
political fabric is too weak to contain securely the destructive impulses of envy, inequality may be destabilizing. But if Tocqueville is
right, more inequality may be less destabilizing than less inequality.
The broader point is that it is not the degree to which income is
unequally distributed across the population, but the ethical or emotional response to that degree of inequality,27 that determines the
political consequences of inequality. A strong social commitment to
equality of opportunity, as in the United States, may dampen feelings of envy (without dampening efforts to get ahead) by making
wealth seem more a consequence of personal desert, or luck, or other
virtuous or innocent conditions and less a ratification and reward of
injustice. If so, then maximizing equality of opportunity may alleviate the pressures for redistribution at the same time that, for the reasons I explained earlier, it makes the distribution of income more
unequal. Contrariwise, however, equality of opportunity may exacerbate envy precisely by making outcomes seem the result of luck
rather than of desert (especially if, as in Rawls, even genetic endowments are seen as a product of luck), and therefore arbitrary, or
by underscoring differences in ability and thereby humiliating the
losers in the competition to demonstrate superiority. It is an empirical question, therefore, how equality affects envy and self-esteem
and hence political community or stability. Evidence presented by
Sam Peltzman that equality precedes and facilitates the redistributive
state suggests that envy does not drive egalitarian policies.28
26

Raymond Boudon, “The Logic of Relative Frustration,” in Rationality
and Revolution 245 (Michael Taylor ed. 1988).
27 On the difference, see Peter van Wijck, “Equity and Equality in East
and West,” 47 Kyklos 531, 543 (1994) (tab. 4).
28 Peltzman, “The Growth of Government,” 23 Journal of Law and

18

CHICAGO WORKING PAPER IN LAW & ECONOMICS

This discussion has implications for the question how far the
law should go in protecting property rights. On the one hand, a robust protection of those rights will make an economic system
operate more efficiently, resulting in higher average incomes and
greater economic opportunities. On the other hand, if that protection is pushed to the point at which redistributive measures such as
progressive taxation are deemed unconstitutional or otherwise forbidden because they impinge on property rights, inequality of
incomes may grow to the point at which envy demands redress, but
the safety valve that is the democratic process will be closed and
political stability may therefore be endangered. We want a political
process supple enough to respond to demands for equality when
those demands, whether rooted in envy or in some other emotion or
principle, become exigent. The advantage of democracy as a political
system is its ability to mediate between equality and stability.
VI. AN E MPIRICAL STUDY OF THE E FFECT OF
E QUALITY ON C OMMUNITY
For the reasons explained in the preceding parts of the paper, I
hypothesize a positive correlation between political community and
average incomes,29 but no correlation between political community
and equality of incomes. Table 1 tests this hypothesis. Measures of
political stability, such as the risk of expropriation, the “coup count,”
and the frequency of extraconstitutional changes of regime, and of
democratic liberty (commitment to the rule of law and a “freedom
rating” based on civil liberties and political rights) are regressed on a
measure of income equality (the ratio of the income of the poorest
20 percent of households to the income of the richest 20 percent30),
Economics 209, 263 (1980).
29 I would prefer median to average incomes, but do not have the data.
30 This is not a sophisticated measure of income inequality, but there are
insufficient data to construct sophisticated measures, such as the Gini
coefficient, for enough of the years and countries in the sample. An alternative
to the ratio of richest to poorest quintiles would be separate variables for the
poorest and for the richest, but the alternative procedure would be more
cumbersome, less intuitive, and yield similar results.
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on the average income in the society, and on changes in that income (which might be thought destabilizing). Because the countries
aggregated in the table differ from each other in many respects other
than income that are potentially relevant to political community or
stability, I also include regional dummy variables.31 The dependent
variable in the last regression is a measure of gender equality,32
viewed as a nonpolitical dimension of community—a dimension
that joins citizens across the gender line.33
In only one of the regressions—the last, the regression on gender equality—is the sign of the coefficient of the income-equality
variable statistically significant at the conventional 5 percent level
(indicated by a t statistic with an absolute value greater than 1.96).
And, surprisingly, it is negative, implying that, other things being
equal, increased economic equality reduces gender equality. To test
my earlier conjecture that extreme inequalities in income might be
politically destabilizing, I replaced (in an unpublished set of regressions) the equality variable in Table 1 with the square of that variable, the effect being to increase the spread between the most and
the least equal distributions of income. But this adjusted equality
variable, like the unadjusted variable, failed to attain statistical
significance.
31

For a fuller discussion of the data and methodology used in Tables 1
and 2, see the Statistical Appendix to this paper.
32 The construction of this variable is explained in the Statistical
Appendix. The African regional dummy variable is excluded in the regression
of this variable because the data source has only two observations for Africa.
An alternative specification of the gender-equality variable would be to
substitute it for the equality variable in the independent variables in the
regression equations, on the theory that it is a more meaningful measure of
economic equality than a ratio of the incomes of the poorest households to
those of the richest. I have done this in a series of unpublished regressions.
The gender-equality variable did not attain statistical significance.
33 Such measures of welfare as infant mortality, life expectancy, and female
secondary education might also be thought good proxies of a nonpolitical sense
of community. However, when they are substituted as dependent variables for
the dependent variables in Table 1, the equality variable again fails to achieve
statistical significance, while the income-level variable continues to be
significant, and in the predicted direction.

TABLE 1
REGRESSIONS OF POLITICAL STABILITY ON REAL AVERAGE IN COME,
G ROWTH IN REAL AVERAGE INCOME , INCOME EQUALITY , AND REGION
(T STATISTIC IN PARENTHESES)

D EPENDENT
V ARIABLES
(N=N UMBER OF
O BSERVATIONS)

I NDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Share of income held by
poorest 20% of
households/ Real GDP/capita
in constant $
Share of in(Chain Index)
North
come held by
Ten-year
America,
richest 20% of (1985 IP) (log)
(Lagged by
Growth in
Europe,
households
Five Years)
GDP/
and Aus(Lagged by
capita
Africa
tral- asia
Asia
Five Years)

Latin
America

Constant R-squared

Expropriation Risk
(log)(N=100)

-.2067
(-0.469)

-.1617
(-3.576)

.0182
(0.167)

-.0388
(-0.281)

-.0841
(-0.716)

-.0697
(-0.625)

.1359
(1.229)

-.6075
(-1.525)

.49

Corruption in Govt.
(N=100)

-.5730
(-0.301)

-1.2603
(-6.452)

.0314
(0.067)

-.6494
(-1.089)

-.2865
(-0.565)

.0922
(0.191)

.7281
(1.524)

6.7155
(3.904)

.69

Rule of Law (N=100)

2.498
(1.458)

1.2469
(7.096)

1.0369
(2.449)

1.7599
(3.281)

1.3012
(2.852)

.4438
(1.023)

.2984
(0.694)

-7.9087
(-5.111)

.78

Protest Demonstrations per Capita
(N=102)

.0048
(1.817)

.0001
(0.331)

.0004
(0.814)

-.0012
(-2.308)

-.0012
(-2.487)

-.0015
(-3.207)

-.0010
(-2.253)

.0003
(0.175)

.17
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Deaths from Political
Violence per
Capita(N=102)

.3351
(1.575)

-.0225
(-1.317)

-.0373
(-1.080)

-.0165
(-0.381)

.0119
(0.316)

.0384
(0.994)

.0097
(0.269)

.1620
(1.123)

.11

Irregular Executive
Transfers (N=102)

.2506
(0.971)

-.0542
(-2.613)

-.0073
(-0.175)

-.0501
(-0.956)

.0312
(0.685)

-.0176
(-0.375)

.0889
(2.025)

.4298
(2.453)

.15

Coup d’états (N=123)

-.1967
(-0.889)

-.0434
(-2.323)

-.0706
(-1.833)

-.1010
(-1.944)

.0084
(0.186)

-.0158
(-0.360)

.0168
(0.392)

.4446
(2.762)

.14

Freedom Rat ing
(log)(N=136)

-.8902
(-0.621)

.9154
(6.411)

-.2207
(-0.800)

.6628
(1.657)

.9511
(2.807)

.4974
(1.559)

.3573
(1.147)

-9.7890
(-7.897)

.63

Gender Equal ity
(N=16)

-.5525
(-2.172)

.0115
(0.214)

-.0312
(-0.419)

___

.1583
(1.678)

.0795
(1.642)

.0319
(0.563)

.6686
(1.543)

.77
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TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS OF PROXIES FOR POLITICAL COMMUNITY
(SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL IN PARENTHESES , WITH NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BELOW)

Expropriation Risk

Corruption
in Govt.

Rule
of Law

Protest
Demonstrations
per Capita

Deaths
from
Political
Violence
per Capita

*

0.6926
(0.000)
371

–0.8167
(0.000)
371

-0.0368
(0.718)
99

0.0476
(0.640)
99

0.2543
(0.009)
105

0.2451
(0.000)
227

–0.5687
(0.000)
362

-0.4189
(0.007)
40

Corruption
in Govt.

0.6926
(0.000)
371

*

–0.7726
(0.000)
371

-0.1203
(0.236)
99

0.0738
(0.468)
99

0.2592
(0.008)
105

0.2248
(0.001)
227

–0.5408
(0.000)
362

-0.4585
(0.003)
40

Rule of Law

–0.8167
(0.000)
371

–0.7726
(0.000)
371

*

-0.0808
(0.426)
99

-0.0959
(0.345)
99

-0.2001
(0.041)
105

–0.2666
(0.000)
227

0.5748
(0.000)
362

-0.4923
(0.001)
40

Protest
Demonstrations
per Capita

-0.0368
(0.718)
99

-0.1203
(0.236)
99

-0.0808
(0.426)
99

*

0.0072
(0.868)
539

0.0710
(0.099)
539

0.0206
(0.642)
511

0.2070
(0.002)
222

----

Deaths
from
Political
Violence
per Capita

0.0476
(0.640)
99

0.0738
(0.468)
99

-0.0959
(0.345)
99

0.0072
(0.868)
539

*

0.0758
(0.079)
539

0.1650
(0.000)
511

-0.1508
(0.025)
222

----

Expropriation
Risk
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Irregular
Executive
Transfers

Coup
d’états

Freedom
Rating

Gender
Equity

Irregular
Executive
Transfers

0.2543
(0.009)
105

0.2592
(0.008)
105

-0.2001
(0.041)
105

0.0710
(0.099)
539

0.0758
(0.079)
539

*

0.6071
(0.000)
560

-0.1715
(0.008)
236

----

Coup d’états

0.2451
(0.000)
227

0.2248
(0.001)
227

–0.2666
(0.000)
227

0.0206
(0.642)
511

0.1650
(0.000)
511

0.6071
(0.000)
560

*

–0.1086
(0.040)
359

----

Freedom
Rating

–0.5687
(0.000)
362

–0.5408
(0.000)
362

0.5748
(0.000)
362

0.2070
(0.002)
222

-0.1508
(0.025)
222

-0.1715
(0.008)
236

–0.1086
(0.040)
359

*

.6654
(0.000)
39

Gender Equity

–0.4189
(0.007)
40

–0.4585
(0.003)
40

-0.4923
(0.001)
40

----

----

----

----

0.6654
(0.000)
39

*
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In only one of the regressions is the sign of the coefficient of the
change-in-income variable statistically significant: the rule of law is
more secure the more average income has grown in the preceding
decade. This finding is in tension with the literature that finds a
negative correlation between number of lawyers and economic
growth;34 but of course the correlation between the rule of law and
the number of lawyers may be very weak. It is also in tension with
the idea that rising expectations may be destabilizing.
As predicted, the level of income has a highly statistically
significant effect in six of the equations. And in all but one of the
nine equations, including all six in which the sign of the coefficient
is statistically significant, the sign is as predicted: political
community is enhanced by high average income. The exception—the positive, but not significant, sign of the protestdemonstrations variable—is only apparent. Stable democratic societies are able to tolerate such demonstrations, which are likely to be
viewed as destabilizing, and therefore severely repressed, in unstable
or undemocratic societies.
I do not wish to overstate the significance of these results,
which is limited.35 International economic data, especially for the
poorer nations, tend to be unreliable; political data are often both
unreliable and subjective. But the results of my study do cast at least
some doubt on the proposition that income equality is a key to the
values associated with political community, while at the same
providing at least suggestive support for the proposition that high
average incomes promote political community. The qualification
implicit in my use of the word “suggestive” deserves emphasis, and
not only because of problems with the quality of the data. Using
34 See, for example, Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W .
Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,” 106 Q.J. Econ.
503 (1991); and for criticism, Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 89–90
(1995).
35 A regression analysis using different independent variables from my
own found a significant positive relation between income inequality and
political violence. Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality
and Insurgency,” 81 American Political Science Review 425 (1987).
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two-staged least-squares analysis to test for the direction of causality
between my dependent and my independent variables, I was unable
to reject the hypothesis that it is political community that promotes
high average incomes rather than vice versa. In fact the causal process probably is two-way, since a stable, rights-enforcing political
environment encourages investment in both physical and human
capital.36
I mentioned in Part I that the various measures of political stability, democracy, and community tend to be positively correlated.
Table 2 tests this suggestion by calculating correlation coefficients
for the dependent variables in the previous tables.37 As expected, the
variables are for the most part strongly correlated, and with the predicted sign. Thus, expropriation risk is strongly positively correlated
with corruption in government and strongly negatively correlated
with the rule of law and freedom variables; corruption is strongly
negatively correlated with the rule of law; coup d’états are negatively
correlated with the rule of law and strongly positively correlated with
irregular executive transfers; and so on.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX
This appendix describes the data used in Tables 1 and 2 and adds
another table containing some of the descriptive statistics underlying
36 This is suggested by an economic literature that finds a positive correlation between political stability and economic growth. See, for example, Robert
J. Barro, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” 101 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 407, 437 (1991). See also Roger C. Kormendi and Philip
G. Meguire, “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-Country
Evidence,” 16 Journal of Monetary Economics 141, 156 (1985); Kevin B. Grier
and Gordon Tullock, “An Empirical Analysis of Cross National Economic
Growth, 1951–80,” 24 Journal of Monetary Economics 259, 271–73 (1989).
Rights are not costless, however, and their overprotection can reduce national
wealth, especially in a poor country. Richard A. Posner, “The Costs of
Enforcing Legal Rights,” Eastern European Constitutional Review, Summer
1995, p. 71.
37 The numbers in parentheses indicate the probability that the correlation
coefficient is actually zero, that is, that the variables are not correlated with
each other. I have excluded the gender-equality variable, as it is not political i n
character.
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the data in Table 1. The data on which these tables are based include observations on 131 countries over a span of 36 years (1960 to
1995), although because of missing data the number of observations
in the individual regressions ranges from 100 to 136 (except for the
regression of gender equality, where there are only 16 observations).
Because the data for each country are averaged over five years, there
is a maximum of seven observations for each country (the early 1960s
[1960 through 1964], the late 1960s, the early 1970s, the late 1970s,
the early 1980s, the late 1980s, and the early 1990s). So were it not
for the missing data I would have 917 observations for use in my regressions.
Although the data cover different years, even different decades,
they are treated in the regressions as cross-sectional rather than
time-series data. This is proper because for each country-period (for
example, France from 1960 through 1974), all the data for the dependent and independent variables are for that period.
Data for the expropriation, corruption, and rule of law variables
were obtained from the Center for Institutional Reform and the
Informal Sector (IRIS) of the University of Maryland. I thank
Professor Stephen Knack of the Center for making these data available to me with the permission of Business Environmental Risk
Intelligence S.A. These data cover the years 1982–1995. Higher
scores on each of the BERI variables (two of which I rescored to
make their interpretation more intuitive) indicate more of the variable—that is, greater risk of expropriation, or more corruption, or
more adherence to the rule of law.
The variables for number of nonviolent protest demonstrations
(per capita), deaths from domestic political violence (per capita), and
frequency of changes in the national leadership outside the conventional legal or customary procedures for transferring power are from
Charles Lewis Taylor (Principal Investigator), World Handbook of
Political and Social Indicators III, 1948–1982, Part 3: Annual
Political Events Data (Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research [ICPSR] No. 7761, 2d ed. Spring 1985), covering the years 1960–1982. The publishers of the World Handbook
have asked users of their data to state that the data were made available in part by the ICPSR and that neither Charles Lewis Taylor,
who collected the original, nor the ICPSR, assume any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data by users.
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The number of coup d’états is estimated from data in Henry
Bienen and Nicolas Van De Walle, Of Time and Power: Leadership
Duration in the Modern World (1991), covering the years
1960–1987. The freedom rating is from Freedom House Survey
Team, Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and
Civil Liberties (various years). This variable, which covers the years
1977 to 1994, I derived by combining the ratings for “political
rights” and “civil liberties.” Higher levels (again, I have rescored this
variable to make its interpretation more intuitive) of this variable
indicate more freedom.
The gender-equality variable is the ratio of the Human Development Index for females to the HDI for males, for 1993. See
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1993 100–101 and Technical Note Tab. 1.1
(1993). The HDI combines longevity, income, and knowledge to
arrive at a measure of well being. Id. at 100.
The data for the income-equality variable are from World Bank,
World*Data (computer laser optical disc, 1994), for various years.
Data on real gross domestic product per capita are from the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6
(http://nber.harvard.edu/pwt56.html), also for various years. The
ten-year growth in GDP per capita is the simple percentage change
between the first and the tenth year, rather than a summing of the
annual percentage changes. The Chain Index, which I use in calculating GDP per capita in the tables, is a method of adjusting for
changes in consumption bundles over time.
The first two independent variables—the equality variable and
average income—are lagged five years, partly because political conditions are unlikely to respond instantaneously to broad income aggregates, and partly to reduce the likelihood that the independent
variables are effects, rather than causes, of the dependent variables.
The third independent variable is the percentage change in real
GDP per capita in the decade preceding each of the observations
that make up each of the dependent variables. The remaining variables are the regional dummies. For statistical reasons, it is necessary
to omit one of the regional dummies in each of the regressions.
Table 1 omits the Middle East, but the results of the regressions are
not altered materially when any of the other regional dummies is
omitted instead.
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Table A1 lists the values of the first three independent variables
for the most recent five-year period for which these values are available. The countries are listed in the order of increasing equality.
Countries with missing variables are not included in the regressions.
TABLE A1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Ten-Year Share of Income of
Growth in Poorest 20% of
Time
Real GDP GDP per Households/ Share
Rank
Country
Period
per C apita
Capita
of Richest 20%
1 Brazil
Late 1980s
4,221.40
10.45%
0.0311
2 Guatemala
Late 1980s
2,098.60 –14.74%
0.0333
3 Panama
Late 1980s
3,233.00
10.74%
0.0334
4 Guinea–Bissau Early 1990s
638.67
9.74%
0.0357
5 Tanzania
Early 1990s
521.25
13.71%
0.0383
6 Honduras
Late 1980s
1,403.40
–2.38%
0.0425
7 Gabon
Late 1960s
2,993.60
39.69%
0.0474
8 S. Africa
Early 1990s 3,167.33 –10.14%
0.0521
9 Chile
Early 1990s 4,566.33
26.53%
0.0546
10 Kenya
Early 1990s
909.00
5.45%
0.0550
11 Senegal
Early 1990s 1,132.50
–2.22%
0.0597
12 Botswana
Late 1980s
2,362.80
56.33%
0.0611
13 Zimbabwe
Early 1990s 1,197.33
–6.31%
0.0642
14 Colombia
Early 1990s 3,325.67
12.96%
0.0645
15 Iran
Early 1970s 5,295.20
79.80%
0.0661
16 Bahamas
Early 1970s
––
––
0.0672
17 Costa Rica
Late 1980s
3,317.60
–7.57%
0.0693
18 Lebanon
Early 1970s
––
––
0.0727
19 Liberia
Early 1970s 1,016.80
33.79%
0.0730
20 Mexico
Early 1980s 5,877.60
33.61%
0.0733
21 Domin.
Late 1980s
2,247.80
9.01%
0.0755
Repub.
22 Nicaragua
Early 1990s 1,294.00 –31.09%
0.0759
23 Ecuador
Early 1990s 2,806.67
–9.18%
0.0800
24 Sudan
Late 1960s
––
––
0.0808
25 Trinidad
Late 1970s
9,440.60
44.21%
0.0840
26 USSR
Early 1990s 7,372.40
13.07%
0.0875
27 Malaysia
Late 1980s
4,169.00
36.30%
0.0877
28 Argentina
Early 1990s 4,706.00 –19.95%
0.0904
29 Venezuela
Late 1980s
6,354.60 –20.01%
0.0949
30 Peru
Late 1980s
2,681.80 –10.05%
0.0953
31 Guyana
Early 1990s 1,094.00 –31.85%
0.1020
32 UK
Late 1980s 12,291.20
24.91%
0.1038
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Rank
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Country
Nigeria
Turkey
Singapore
El Salvador
Ivory Coast
US
Zambia
Sierra Leone
New Zealand
Hong Kong
Bolivia
Switzerland
Uruguay
Thailand
Egypt
Jamaica
Philippines
Tunisia
Paraguay
Portugal
France
Jordan
Denmark
Canada
Morocco
Algeria
Israel
Ghana
China
Italy
Finland
Norway
Yugoslavia
Australia
Germany
S. Korea
Vietnam
Ireland
Cyprus
Uganda
Malawi
Indonesia

Time
Period
Early 1990s
Late 1980s
Early 1980s
Late 1970s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Late 1970s
Early 1980s
Early 1980s
Early 1990s
Early 1980s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Early 1970s
Early 1990s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Early 1990s
Early 1970s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Early 1980s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Late 1980s
Late 1970s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Late 1980s
Early 1980s
Late 1970s
Late 1970s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Early 1970s
Late 1960s
Early 1990s
Late 1960s
Early 1990s
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Ten-Year Share of Income of
Growth in Poorest 20% of
Real GDP GDP per Households/ Share
per C apita
Capita
of Richest 20%
1,004.33 –25.04%
0.1041
3,329.40
11.25%
0.1042
7,964.40
95.09%
0.1043
2,194.00
20.72%
0.1070
1,475.60 –28.45%
0.1081
17,281.80
16.99%
0.1122
694.00 –24.60%
0.1127
1,147.60
4.69%
0.1132
10,904.60
7.24%
0.1141
9,623.60
85.17%
0.1149
1,691.67 –10.60%
0.1162
14,287.60
5.25%
0.1166
4,483.00
0.15%
0.1172
2,778.20
45.44%
0.1203
1,186.00
34.44%
0.1206
2,492.50
5.03%
0.1240
1,618.20
–6.71%
0.1253
2,972.67
13.30%
0.1274
2,150.67
–8.77%
0.1280
4,028.80
94.14%
0.1297
12,871.60
16.80%
0.1337
2,919.00 –72.55%
0.1363
11,653.60
14.44%
0.1399
16,600.40
25.48%
0.1418
2,188.33
14.76%
0.1425
2,896.60
13.90%
0.1484
7,371.60
50.51%
0.1508
807.80 –13.62%
0.1522
1,398.33
38.01%
0.1531
11,508.60
27.25%
0.1659
11,241.00
27.75%
0.1676
10,770.60
44.17%
0.1689
4,898.40
81.38%
0.1705
14,170.20
19.48%
0.1705
13,136.80
19.21%
0.1737
5,123.80
82.15%
0.1754
––
––
0.1773
5,368.40
48.29%
0.1827
3,189.20
38.37%
0.2005
554.67 –31.94%
0.2029
444.80
15.11%
0.2055
2,040.00
37.32%
0.2057
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Rank
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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Country
Ethiopia
Pakistan
India
Bulgaria
Sweden
Belgium
Netherlands
Sri Lanka
Spain
Japan
Bangladesh
Poland
Luxembourg
Hungary
Slovakia

Time
Period
Early 1980s
Early 1990s
Early 1990s
Early 1990s
Early 1980s
Late 1970s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s
Late 1980s
Late 1970s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
Early 1990s

Ten-Year Share of Income of
Growth in Poorest 20% of
Real GDP GDP per Households/ Share
per C apita
Capita
of Richest 20%
323.20
7.02%
0.2082
1,406.67
23.07%
0.2116
1,265.67
34.07%
0.2131
5,555.00
29.10%
0.2137
12,636.20
13.73%
0.2168
10,227.40
42.04%
0.2194
11,974.40
10.36%
0.2222
2,165.67
21.80%
0.2265
8,329.00
13.08%
0.2268
9,030.20
63.70%
0.2320
1,280.20
28.15%
0.2461
4,390.80 –10.22%
0.2780
14,442.00
29.22%
0.3000
5,499.40
14.82%
0.3251
––
––
0.7768

N OTES—(1) The real GDP per capita for Tanzania and for the USSR are Late
1980s figures. (2) The ten-year growth in GDP per capita for Gabon, Cyprus, and
Malawi all use Early 1960s as the base period.
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